Path to the Stanley Cup Part I - A New Identity?

I now begin a series of 7 articles that will take a look at the Montreal Canadiens' eventual path to the Stanley Cup.

The first quinquennial plan (2003-2004 to 2008-2009) established by Bob Gainey was a failure. The Montreal Canadiens didn't win the Stanley Cup during that period. However, the team did have some success. In 2007-2008, they finished first in the eastern conference with 104 points and went to the second round of the playoffs losing to the Flyers. The 2008-2009 season however was more difficult. Bob Gainey seeing that the window of opportunity of his plan was closing down that season made some panicking moves like firing of coach Guy Carbonneau and replacing him behind the bench. Without Markov and Lang for the playoffs and an injured Bouillon, the Habs folded to the Bruins in 4 games. The window of opportunity was now closed: the contracts of Montreal's core players were now up (Koivu, Kovalev, Lang, Brisebois, Schneider and Brisebois) and were now too old to be re-signed for multiple years. It was time to start anew and Gainey thus announced another quinquennial plan. This news was received with disdain: "Not another five years!" This new plan changed the face of the franchise with the arrival of six new veteran faces with different contract length(years): Gomez(5), Gionta(5), Cammalleri(5), Moen(3), Spacek(3) and Gill(2).

Now, 3 years have passed and we should theoretically be at the beginning of the two-year window of opportunity for a shot at the Stanley Cup. However, much has changed in the last season. Cammalleri, Spacek and Gill where all traded during the season, the Habs finished last in the eastern conference, Pierre Gauthier (who succeeded Bob Gainey as general manager) was fired by owner and president Geoff Molson and Bob Gainey decided to resign after learning the news. Since the group presided by the Molson family acquired the Montreal Canadiens franchise, Geoff Molson has exhibited multiple signs of wanting to meddle with the operation affairs of the club. One such sign of meddling was at the 2011 entry draft when Geoff Molson wanted the Montreal Canadiens to draft Olivier Archambault (a Quebecer) contrary to the scouting staff's will. With Gauthier and Gainey now out, the second quinquennial plan now seems officially over, or is it?

Geoff Molson has made public statements saying that he wants to change the identity of club by bringing "a winning attitude", make his team harder to play against and bring more grit. This seems contrary to the image/plan of the second quinquennial plan that brought in the 3 "smurfs". However, in the last 2 years of Gainey's first quinquennial plan, the Habs were one of the most physical team in the league. This indicates to me that Gainey values physical play. And if we assume that the second quinquennial plan was a logical follow-up to the first one, physical play and the "hard to play against mentality" were probably always a part of the plan (even if it would only materialize at a later stage). Let's not forget that Gauthier/Gainey were the ones that brought in Moen, Cole, Emelin and Bourque. (It could however be argued that Molson asked specifically for these moves as they happened only in the last year). In the last season, Montreal has jumped from the 26th to the 17th position in hits. Marc Bergevin has followed the same route by adding Prust, Armstrong and Bouillon, all physical players. It should be emphasized that it is much less expensive and easier to add bottom6 gritty players to a line-up than top6 skilled players. The big (overpaid) contracts that were given in 2009 now offer good market value relative to the new cap ceiling. For example, when Mike Cammalleri was signed in the 2009 summer, his contract was accounting for 10.56% of the then available cap space (6M / 56.8M), but will only be accounting for 8.55% next season (6M / 70.2M). This explains in part why Calgary did not re-sign him at that price in 2009, but were now willing to trade for him this season.

Identifying the identity of a team

To identify the identity of a team, you first need to identify the identity of the its players individually. However, not all players should be assigned the same weight. Players with a bigger role on the team should be put more weight on. Players with longer contracts or contracts that are expected to be extended (particularly for young players who are RFA) should also be weighted more heavily. Thus, the veteran defensemen Gill/Spacek with their 2/3 year contracts where never expected to be part of the team at the end of the 5-year plan. On the other hand, players that are drafted by the team are expected to play with the team until they have at least 7 years of professional experience or are at least 27 years old. The drafting choices of the Habs have thus much more impact on its identity than the signing of UFA to five years or less terms. How a team drafts in the first round is a clear indicator of what identity it is aiming for.

1st round drafting by the Montreal Canadiens

2012: Galchenyuk

2011: Beaulieu

2010: Tinordi

2009: Leblanc

2008: none, (Kristo)

2007: McDonagh, (Eller), Pacioretty, (Subban)

2006: David Fischer

2005: Price

2004: Chipchura

2003: A. Kostitsyn

2002: Higgins

2001: Komisarek, Perezhogin

Note1: Acquired by trade or highly talented 2nd round picks between parentheses

Note2: Excluding the last 5 drafts, all of the Habs' first rounders made it in the NHL, except David Fisher

• Common denominator: above average speed
• Many of these players play a physical game: Komisarek, Higgins, A. Kostitsyn, Pacioretty, Tinordi, Beaulieu or intense game along the boards: Eller, Subban, Leblanc, Galchenyuk
• Higgins and Chipchura faced serious injuries in their career and were traded away.
• McDonagh, as the last playoffs have revealed, plays a relatively soft game and was traded away (in the Gomez trade). On the other hand, Eller was acquired through trade (Halak trade) and plays an intense game.

Has the franchise improved in the last 3 years?

As Jacques Martin, former coach of Montreal Canadiens, said multiple times in his interviews, players should focus primarily on the process and not the results. Obviously the results were not there last season as the team finished last in the eastern conference, but what about the process?

Offensive abilities can rarely be improved in a player, however the defensive side of their game can be improved with good coaching combined with willingness from the player. Such improvement is most important for young players who have few games of experience in the NHL. Gorges, Subban and Eller are three young players that have greatly improved their games during the last seasons. Gorges and Subban have been used with Hal Gill as a shutdown defensive pair in the playoffs with success. The acquisition of Gill in 2009, who had just won the Stanley Cup with Pittsburgh, was a great mentor for their development. Lars Eller and Andrei Kostitsyn (on the same line as Moen) were used as a shutdown line against high quality of opposition for some games this season. Andrei Kostitsyn has had some success with Nashville after being traded making some great defensive plays in the playoffs. Desharnais, Pacioretty and even Cole just had their most productive season in all their respective careers. Although the young players have displayed some encouraging improvement, some would argue that some of the veterans have regressed. The most glaring example is Gomez which I will now discuss in more details.

Gomez just had his least productive season in all his career (although it should be noted that he played only 38 games). Is it possible that his talent has completely disappeared? I highly doubt it. His talent (which is still present) just does not translate in point production anymore. Gomez is a fairly uni-dimensional player in some aspects. He has great vision, speed and passing skills, however his shot is terribly slow and inaccurate. He thus relies heavily on his wingers to complete the plays he creates and his production is thus very dependent on the quality of his teammates. Gomez was however demoted this season (to the profit of Desharnais) and has played with really low-skilled wingers. Last season, he was the center who played with the lowest quality of teammates on the team which was not the case the previous seasons. Gomez also played some nights as a winger, because of the surplus of centers on the team which is not his natural position. Gomez also played very few nights with his long time buddy Giointa with which he has very good chemistry. (Both were together in the line-up only 13 games this season and when they were, they did not necessarily play on the same line.) On November 19, 2011 when Gomez played  against his former team the New York Rangers on the same line as Gionta, he had a very productive night with 2 assists and was all over the ice. Gomez and Gionta also need a big body on their line to create some space for them. When it was the case (with Pouliot or Pacioretty), their line was very productive. Another possible explanation for Gomez's production decrease is that Gomez is a power play specialist that used to make a good proportion of his point production on the power play. However, power play opportunities have greatly decreased league-wide in the last seasons as I have illustrated in one of my previous post.

My general conclusion is that individually most players on the current roster of the Montreal Canadiens have improved over the last seasons. However, not all of them were used in their "right chair" (teammates, opposition faced). If results did not materialize, it was because their utilization was not optimal to guarantee results and wins. Facing a quality of opposition a notch too high for your abilities may help you develop your defensive game (process), but it will not translate into wins for the team (results).